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As part of welfare reform efforts in the 1990s, twenty-three states implemented family caps,
provisions that deny or reduce cash assistance to welfare recipients who have additional births. We
use birth and abortion records from 24 states to estimate effects of family caps on birth and abortion
rates. We use age, marital status and completed schooling to identify women at high risk for use of
public assistance, and parity (number of previous live births) to identify those most directly affected
by the family cap. In family cap states, birth rates fell more and abortion rates rose more among
high-risk women with at least one previous live birth compared to similar childless women,
consistent with an effect of the family cap. However, this parity-specific pattern of births and
abortions also occurred in states that implemented welfare reform with no family cap. Thus, the
effects of welfare reform may have differed between mothers and childless women, but there is little
evidence of an independent effect of the family cap.
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A primary motivation for state and federal welfare reform was the high rate of non-marital fertility and 
economic dependence among single mothers.  State waivers in the early 1990s gave states authority to 
implement policies to reduce the need for public assistance.  The state waivers were followed by national 
welfare reform legislation, the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA), which adopted many state initiatives and ended the guarantee of long-term cash assistance to 
single mothers.  Components of welfare reform such as time limits, work requirements and sanctions for non-
compliance, higher earned-income disregards, and increased child care subsidies were all intended to 
encourage employment and economic self-sufficiency.  Time-limiting benefits and requiring work also 
increase the cost of childbearing among welfare recipients or potential recipients, and thus may lower the 
incidence of non-marital birth.   
Despite the intentions of policymakers, PRWORA contains few provisions designed specifically to 
reward marriage or to penalize non-marital fertility.  Only the family cap, which permits states to deny or 
reduce cash assistance for additional births to current recipients, operates directly on fertility incentives.  In 
this paper, we analyze the association between family cap provisions and births and abortions.  Our analysis is 
distinct because it is the only econometric study of the effect of the family cap that analyzes both birth and 
abortion rates among women at risk for public assistance.  Most previous analyses of the effect of welfare 
reform on fertility behavior have examined only births (Kearney, forthcoming; Joyce, Kaestner and Korenman 
2003; Kaushal and Kaestner 2001; Mills et al. 2001; Hovarth-Rose and Peters 2001; Fein 1999; Dyer and 
Fairlie 2001).
1  Broadening the analysis of the effects of welfare reform to include abortions as well as births 
provides additional information on changes in reproductive behavior associated with welfare reform.  For 
example, a fall in birth rates associated with the family cap may be accompanied by a rise in abortion rates 
(Jaganathan and Camasso 2003; Camasso et al. 2003).  Moreover, the fall in birth rates should be expected to 
                                                           
1 Levine (2002) is an exception, but he uses aggregate abortion rates for all adult women; it is questionable, therefore, 
whether he is able to identify effects of the family cap on women exposed to the policy.   Jaganathan and Camasso (2003) 
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exceed the rise in abortion rates since women affected by welfare reform may also decrease sexual activity or 
increase contraceptive effort in order to control fertility.  
We also estimate the effects of the family cap on pregnancy resolution.  Specifically, we investigate 
whether the fraction of pregnancies that are terminated, henceforth the abortion ratio, increased with the family 
cap.  We recognize that the abortion ratio cannot identify changes in sexual activity and contraception in 
response to the family cap.   However, the abortion ratio has one distinct advantage over measures of birth and 
abortion rates: it is measured entirely from vital statistics; no population estimates are required for its 
construction. Therefore, we are able to calculate the abortion ratio and examine the effect of the family cap for 
small populations with a high proportion of members likely to be affected by the family cap.  In addition, 
pregnancy resolution is of interest because rates of unintended pregnancy and abortion are high among 
unmarried women.  Henshaw (1998) estimates that 75 percent of all pregnancies to teens, and 75 percent of all 
pregnancies to unmarried women are unintended.  In multi-state studies of the family cap, most researchers 
have used between-state variation to identify effects of the family cap.
2  Controls for other aspects of welfare 
reform are included in the regressions or the study period is limited to the pre-TANF years (Hovarth-Rose and 
Peters 2001; Dyer and Fairlie 2001).  A potential limitation of this strategy is that it is difficult to characterize 
and measure the differences in complex multi-faceted welfare reform programs adopted by different states and 
enforced to varying degrees (see Moffitt 2003a and 2003b for discussion of these and other evaluation 
challenges).  We use a within-state design to estimate effects of the family cap on births and abortions separate 
from the impact of other policies related to welfare reform.  We use parity (0 or 1+ previous births) to define 
within-state treatment and comparison groups.  Specifically, we compare unmarried adult women with 12 or 
fewer years of schooling who have no previous live births to similar women who have had one or more 
previous live births.  Both groups have a high likelihood of being affected by welfare reform, but only those of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
also examine births and abortions but their analysis is unique, since it is based on the experimental evaluation of New 
Jersey’s Family Development Program. 
2 These studies estimate models that include state and year fixed effects with a dummy variable for the state and year in 
which a family cap policy was implemented.  Exceptions are Dyer and Fairlie (2001) and Levine (2002). Dyer and Fairlie 
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parity one or higher should be affected by the family cap.
3 The data used for our analyses were collected 
through a joint effort of the National Bureau of Economic Research and the Alan Guttmacher Institute.    We 
collected individual induced termination of pregnancy (abortion) records from 24 states and New York City.  
This is the largest compilation of such data ever attempted.  Most states report these data to the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), but only aggregates are published annually.
4  We use the micro-level 
data from 1992 to 2000 that amount to a registry of abortions performed in each state each year.  As such, they 
provide advantages over social or health surveys that ask questions regarding induced terminations.  Survey 
data available for analyses of the effects of PRWORA on abortions are limited by underreporting and 
relatively small samples (Klerman 1998).  
 
Previous Research 
  The literature on the effects of welfare policy on pregnancy outcomes (births and abortions) can be 
divided broadly between the pre- and post-welfare reform periods.  The pre-reform literature is summarized by 
Moffitt (1998), who examines fertility, and Klerman (1998), who focuses on abortion.  Both reviewers 
conclude that financial incentives matter: policies that raise the cost of a birth or abortion tend to discourage 
each outcome.  Findings from this literature, however, are hardly robust, and for some questions of interest 
data are often lacking, especially with regard to abortion. 
  The implementation of the family cap in numerous states in the 1990s prompted several researchers to 
re-examine the effects of this policy on fertility.  Argys, Averett and Rees (2001), for instance, use a sample of 
unmarried AFDC recipients from the NLSY (National Longitudinal Survey of Youth) and estimate the 
association between incremental cash and food stamps for an additional child and the probability of pregnancy, 
and conditional on pregnancy, the probability of giving birth.  Although they find a positive association in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
use married mothers with no more than a high school education as a within-state comparison group and Levine uses 
childless women.  In both cases, the analyses are limited to births.  
3 One identifying assumption is that childless women who desire two or more children are not dissuaded from 




some models, they find no effect on pregnancy and birth once they include state-fixed effects.  Grogger and 
Bronars (2001) use data on twins from the 1980 Census to estimate effects of random differences in the 
number of children, and thus of welfare benefits, on the timing of marriage and subsequent births.  They 
investigate whether time to marriage and time to the next birth are affected by the size of payments for an 
additional child.  They find some evidence that maximum benefits affect fertility among blacks but not whites, 
and they find no effect of incremental benefits on subsequent higher order births. Fairlie and London (1997) 
find a positive association between incremental AFDC benefits and fertility among women on AFDC, using 
the 1990 SIPP (Survey of Income and Program Participation).  However, they find a similar association among 
married women and single women who were not on AFDC.  They conclude that the association found for 
AFDC mothers is spurious.  
  Explicit tests of the effects of the family cap on fertility are more recent.  Two studies have found a 
statistically significant association between the family cap and fertility and three others have found none 
(Hovarth-Rose and Peters 2001; Mach 2001; Kearney forthcoming; Dyer and Fairlie 2001; Levine 2002).  
However, the two studies that report an association have methodological limitations or inconsistent findings 
that undermine their credibility.  Hovarth-Rose and Peters (2001), for instance, use vital statistics to analyze 
non-marital birth ratios by state and year between 1984 and 1996.  They find that the family cap is associated 
with a nine percent decline in the non-marital birth ratio among teens and a 12 percent decline among adults in 
models with state and year fixed effects.  However, 20 of the 23 states that implemented family caps did so in 
1995 or later.  Thus, Horvath-Rose and Peters had few post-cap observations in their sample.  In addition, 
some of their other results are counter-intuitive, which raises questions as to the robustness of the 
specification.  For example, they find that minor parent provisions (waivers that condition eligibility among 
teens on co-residence with a parent), are associated with a large increase in the non-marital birth ratio among 
adults, while AFDC-UP programs are associated with lower non-marital birth ratios among teens, but not 
adults.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
4 With few exceptions, abortions are tabulated by state and one other characteristic such as age or race. For an example, 
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  Mach (2001) also finds an association between the family cap and fertility.  She uses CPS (Current 
Population Survey) data, but links households in a given year to their interview in the following year.  Thus, 
Mach is able to analyze changes in fertility among women on welfare who are exposed to the family cap 
compared to their counterparts in states without the cap.  She finds that a loss of an incremental benefit of $50 
is associated with a 19 percent fall in births.  But in Mach’s sample only 25 women in the 23 states with family 
caps had an additional birth in the 10-year study period..  Moreover, Mach does not adjust the standard errors 
for non-independence within states, and thus her estimates appear overly precise. 
  A forthcoming study by Kearney finds no relationship between the family cap and fertility.  She uses 
monthly national natality statistics stratified by maternal age, education and marital status from 1989 to 1998 
to examine the effect of the family cap on births.  She finds no evidence that the family cap lowers fertility in 
models with state and year fixed effects, and instead finds a positive and statistically significant effect of the 
family cap on the fertility of white and black women aged 20 to 34 years with less than high school education 
and with at least one previous live birth.  
  Levine (2002) also uses national natality files and finds no effect of the family cap.  Unlike Kearney, 
however, Levine runs separate regressions of births to women of zero and higher parity.  He finds that the cap 
is associated with a positive and statistically significant effect on births to women of zero parity, but finds no 
association between the family cap and births to women of higher parity. Thus, births to women of higher 
parity, the group most affected by the family cap, fell relative to births to women of zero parity, the 
comparison group, suggestive of an effect of the family cap.  However, the difference in coefficients is not 
statistically significant.  
  Dyer and Fairlie (2001) also find no association between the family cap and fertility.  They use the 
CPS data to describe the fertility of unmarried women with 12 or fewer years of schooling and at least one 
child.  In their first approach they limit the panel to states that implemented a family cap prior to the 
implementation of the TANF (Temporary Assistance to Needy Families) program and a set of comparison 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
see http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss4911a1.htm  
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states without family caps or any other waiver prior to TANF.  Identification comes from a comparison of 
changes in fertility across cap and non-cap states.  They find no association between the family cap and the 
probability of an additional birth.  In the second approach, they use married women with children and 12 or 
fewer years of schooling as a within-state comparison group.  Again they find no association between the 
family cap and non-marital fertility.  The authors also find no effects of the family cap on non-marital 
childbearing in separate analyses of New Jersey, contrary to both the experimental and non-experimental 
evaluations described below.  
  Except for Levine (2002), each of the other studies of the family cap is limited to an analysis of births 
and none provide convincing evidence of an effect of additional cash assistance for an additional child on 
fertility. However, recently published results from an experimental evaluation of New Jersey’s Family 
Development Program provide what many may consider more compelling evidence that the family cap affects 
the reproductive behavior of welfare recipients. 
 
New Jersey’s Family Development Program 
  As part of its waiver agreement with the federal government, New Jersey undertook an experimental 
evaluation of the family cap provision of the New Jersey’s Family Development Program (FDP).  
Implemented in October of 1992, the FDP was the first in the nation to impose a cap on benefits for women 
that have a child while on welfare.
5  The results of the experimental analysis as well as the non-experimental 
analysis commissioned subsequent to the experiment were published in two reports (Camasso et al. 1998a; 
1998b).  The experimental results clearly indicate that the family cap altered reproductive choices of welfare 
recipients.  Births fell eight percent or 2.2 births per thousand recipients, and abortions rose 12 percent or 3.2 
per thousand, among the experimental group relative to the control group.  Effects were greatest for blacks, 
                                                           
5 Neither of the two other experimental evaluations of the family cap has found effects on fertility (Fein 1999; Mills el al. 
2001).  However, sample sizes in both evaluations were small.  In the Delaware’s ABC demonstration there were 1027 
participants at risk of pregnancy (Fein 1999); in Arizona’s EMPOWER evaluation there were fewer than 900 women at 
risk.  Moreover, neither evaluation analyzed abortions presumably because of difficulties in obtaining accurate 
information on abortion from surveys. See the review by Grogger, Karoly and Klerman (2002).  
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with births falling 21 percent and abortions rising 32 percent (relative to black controls).  There were no 
statistically significant differences in either births or abortions among whites, but the substantial increase in the 
use of contraceptives suggests an increased effort to prevent unintended pregnancies (Jagannathan and 
Camasso 2003).    
  There were, however, methodological problems and some anomalous findings.  The family cap 
increased the pregnancy rate, despite a statistically significant increase in the use of contraceptive services.  
Moreover, effects were concentrated among blacks, and only new as opposed to ongoing welfare cases 
responded to the changed incentives.  Critics have also challenged the internal validity of the New Jersey 
experiment.  A survey of participants revealed substantial confusion among women in both experimental and 
control groups as to who was subject to the family cap.  In addition, a small proportion of caseworkers 
admitted to using discretion in the assignment of cases to treatment and control groups (Loury 2000; Rossi 
2000).
6  Finally, the information provided by the New Jersey experiment is in some respects incomplete, even 
abstracting from questions of internal validity (see, e.g., Heckman and Smith 1995 for a general discussion of 
limitations of experimental evaluations, and Moffitt 2003b for a discussion of challenges specific to welfare 
reform).  First, and most obviously, the results pertain to a single state.  Second, the effect of the cap in New 
Jersey is estimated for women on welfare, but the cap may affect other mothers who are at risk of welfare use 
upon the birth of a child, including welfare leavers.  Family cap provisions generally require that women who 
leave and then return to welfare after a birth must not have received benefits for a specified period before the 
additional child is eligible for a higher benefit than children born to mothers on welfare  (see, for example, 
http://www.spdp.org/famcap/famcapexempt.htm).
   
In sum, the results from the New Jersey experiment provide an interesting counterpoint to the non-
experimental studies.  The inability to undertake additional experimental studies means that the resolution of 
                                                           
6 In response to critics, the authors of the New Jersey study demonstrate that actual assignment to the treatment or control 
group and not participants’ perception of group assignment is associated with a rise in abortion after the cap (Camasso et 
al. 2003). In addition, the authors demonstrate that there was no difference in the attrition rate between the experimental 
and control groups (Jagannathan, Camasso and Killingsworth, forthcoming).  This is a significant result since a limitation 
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disagreements about the effect of family caps requires additional non-experimental studies.  Moreover, there is 
value in extending the analysis of the effect of the family cap on abortion to a larger number of states.  Finally, 
the simultaneous implementation of several welfare reform policies suggests that a within-state comparison 
group would improve the research design.  Indeed, the differences between the experimental and non-
experimental findings may be a result of the use of cross-state comparison groups in the non-experimental 
studies.  We therefore use a large sample of states, a before-after design and with a within-state comparison 
group to analyze effects of the family cap on birth and abortion rates.   
 
Research Design and Statistical Methods 
Conceptual Overview 
The family cap provides a financial incentive to not have additional children while on welfare.  All 
else constant, we expect the family cap to lower the probability of an additional birth for women affected by 
the policy (Klerman 1998; Grogger et al. 2002).  Birth rates can fall either through increased use of abortions 
or because of increased use or effectiveness of contraception (including abstinence).  Since contraceptive or 
sexual behavior can change, decreased birth rates could be accompanied by either increases or decreases in the 
abortion rate.   In other words, abortion rates would tend to increase if family cap provisions had little effect on 
contraception and unintended pregnancies, but abortion rates could decrease if family cap provisions 
significantly improved or increased contraception and decreased unintended pregnancies.  In any case, 
pregnancies should decrease. 
We also examine the effect of the family cap on the abortion ratio (abortions divided by pregnancies).  
If the family cap causes abortion rates to rise and birth rates to fall, then the abortion ratio should rise.  This 
would be the case if the family cap had relatively little effect on contraception.  Moreover, estimated effects of 
the family cap on the abortion ratio should be consistent with estimated effects of the family cap on abortion 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
of the research design was the inability to follow women that leave AFDC. They did not discuss effects of potential 
discretionary assignment.  
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and birth rates since changes in the abortion ratio vary directly with changes in the ratio of abortion to birth 
rates.  
The advantage of the abortion ratio is that it is measured entirely with vital statistics and requires no 
population estimates to calculate.  Therefore, we also use estimates of the effect of the family cap on the 
abortion ratio to check estimates of the effect of the family cap on abortion and birth rates.  
Accurate measurement of abortion and birth rates requires population estimates for some small populations 
that are not currently available.  Therefore, estimates that are broadly consistent across the three outcomes 
suggest that the absence of fully detailed population data does not bias estimates of the effect of the family cap 




A straightforward research design would entail a comparison of birth and abortion rates before and 
after implementation of the family cap among women affected by the change in policy relative to similar 
women who were unaffected.  It may also be of interest to examine changes in the abortion ratio to see 
whether the family cap increased the share of pregnancies that were aborted.  A major challenge in analyses of 
the family cap has been to define an appropriate comparison group.  Studies based on non-experimental data 
have identified the effect of the family cap by using states without a family cap as a comparison group 
(Hovarth-Rose and Peter 2001; Kearney, forthcoming; Dyer and Fairlie 2001; Mach 2001).  However, except 
in Arkansas, the family cap was never an isolated policy.  Other policies that were simultaneously 
implemented such as time limits, work requirements and sanctions for noncompliance may also affect fertility 
by reducing the benefits associated with childbearing while on public assistance.  Moreover, states vary with 
respect to the strictness of these policies, which further complicates the ability to isolate changes associated 
with family cap based on changes across states.  Finally, states that implement the policy may differ 
systematically from states that do not, either because of differences in state characteristics that affect fertility  
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(e.g., policy differences) or because of differences in populations.  Thus, the use of women in non-cap states as 
a comparison group may be problematic. 
We use a difference-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) strategy to identify the effect of family cap 
provisions on fertility.  Among adults, we use low-educated women of zero parity who are not affected by a 
family cap provision, but who are at risk for public assistance as a within-state comparison group for similar 
women of higher parity who are affected by the family cap.  This difference-in-differences (DDcap) assumes 
that changes in reproductive choices among low-educated women with no previous live births are a good 
counterfactual for changes among similar women of higher parity had a family cap not been enforced.  
However, unmarried women with modest human capital and previous live births are much more likely to be 
on, or have been on public assistance than their unmarried counterparts with no previous live births.  As a 
result, the response by women of zero parity to waivers and TANF may differ from that of women with 
previous live births, which would undermine the design.
7  Our solution is to estimate the same DD in states 
without family caps (DDnoncap) to capture changes in births and abortions associated with welfare reform 
between women of different parity.  Subtracting DDnoncap from DDcap yields the DDD estimate for the family 
cap.   
For teens, however, we limit the analysis to those with one or more previous live births. For teens, 
schooling and marital status are not useful markers for risk of welfare receipt (that is, since education is not 
complete and relatively few teens are married, unmarried nulliparous teens with only a high school education 
are not a high-risk group).  Birth rates of teens with no previous live births and those with one or more differ 
dramatically, and the risk of public assistance use is likely to differ greatly between the two groups.  However, 
those with at least one previous live birth, although a relatively small proportion of pregnant teens, are at very 
high-risk for public assistance. Therefore, we focus on this group and compare their behavior before and after 
                                                           
7 Grogger, Haider and Klerman (2002) show that the probability of entry into welfare in California fell as much as the 
probability of exit rose in the 1990s.   This suggests that women of zero parity, a proxy for women at risk of entry, may 
have similar responses to welfare reform as women of higher parity, our proxy for women on welfare who are likely to 
exit.   
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welfare reform in states with and without family caps, which is similar to the research design used in most 
other studies. 
We present estimates of both simple and regression-adjusted DDs and DDDs.   As described below, 
we lack detailed population data by state and year for the relevant demographic groups (e.g., parity 0 and 
parity>0) used in our analysis.  Thus, we do not use birth and abortion rates as the dependent variables in our 
regression models.  Rather, we use the natural logarithm of births and abortions as a dependent variable and 
include the natural logarithm of state population by age and race (along with other variables) in the regression 
models.  The coefficients of the policy variables measure relative changes in counts of abortions and births, 
which, adjusted for population, proxy changes in abortion and birth rates.  For the abortion ratio, which does 
not depend on population, we are able to estimate both unadjusted and adjusted estimates of the effect of the 
family cap. 
We illustrate the regression model using the abortion ratio as the dependent variable.  The 
specification is as follows: 
 
 Let abratio be the abortion ratio in group i, state j and year of conception t and let Parity be a 
dichotomous indicator that is one if the mother has at least one previous live birth; Reform is a dichotomous 
indicator that is one for the years in which the policies associated with welfare reform are in effect.
8  We 
define reform as either a pre-TANF waiver or TANF.   Let Capstate be one if the state imposed a family cap at 
any time between 1992 and 1999.  The specification reflects that the family cap always occurs as either a 
                                                           
8 We use the fraction of months in which a waiver or TANF were in effect in the year that welfare reform was 
implemented. 
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waiver or as part of TANF.
9  In other words, we compare changes in the dependent variable among teens and 
adult women exposed to welfare reform that includes a family cap to their counterparts exposed to reform but 
not the family cap.  We also include controls for maximum cash assistance for a family of three, the state 
unemployment rate and the unemployment rate lagged one year as well as state (γ ) and year (λ ) effects.   
Estimates of the DD within-family cap states is β3 + β6 ; the cross-state DD is β5 + β6 and the DDD is β6.
10 
We use the same specification as in equation (1) to analyze the natural log of abortions and births.  But 
for these outcomes, we include the natural log of the state population by age and race on the right-hand-side of 
equation (1) as a proxy for the more detailed populations classified by marital status, schooling and parity, 
which are not available by state and year.  In some specifications we also include state-specific linear and 
quadratic trends in order to control for smooth changes in the dependent variable associated with variation in 
the population.  We interpret the coefficients in these regressions as estimates of the relative changes in 
abortion and birth rates associated with the family cap, with the caveat that these are approximations given the 
lack of detailed population data. 
  We use weighted least squares to account for heteroscedasticity in the estimation of equation (1), 
weighting by pregnancies.  We also use robust procedures to adjust standard errors, clustering observations by 
state, following Bertrand et al. (2002).  Clustering by state takes into account that observations for different 
years within the same policy regime in a state (e.g., before or after reform) are not independent observations.  
 
                                                           
9 Arkansas implemented a family cap with no other welfare reform provisions prior to TANF. 
10 Using equation (1), let ab be the outcome of interest.  Ignoring state and year fixed effects, which fall out after 
differencing, we obtain the following: 
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  We canvassed state health departments between October 2001 and September 2002 in order to obtain 
induced termination of pregnancy files (ITOP) without personal identifiers.
11  The characteristics required for 
our analyses were the mother’s age, race, marital status, parity, completed schooling, gestational age of the 
fetus, and the month and year of termination.  Eighteen states have the data needed to analyze changes among 
unmarried, low-educated women with a previous live birth. For teens, however, we are able to include 24 
states because we use only age, race and parity to determine risk of exposure to the family cap.
12   
Figure 1 displays abortion rates, nationally and for our 24-state sample. The top two series are from 
the Alan Guttmacher Institute provider survey and the bottom series is our 24-state sample as reported by 
state health departments.  Regardless of the source or sample, abortion rates (abortions per 1000 women aged 
15-44) declined between 1992 and 2000.  Abortion rates fell 17 percent in our 24-states sample as measured 
by AGI and 20 percent as measured by state health departments.  State health departments report 
approximately 80 percent of the abortions recorded by AGI.  This discrepancy appears relatively constant 
over time.  
Discrepancies between the total number of abortions reported by state health departments and AGI 
vary by state.  Table 1 displays abortions by state and source in 1996 for the 24 states in our sample.  In 16 
states the difference is less than 10 percent; in four states the difference is between 10 and 15 percent; and in 
three states the difference exceeds 35 percent.  Henshaw (2000) offers various explanations for the 
differences in total abortions between AGI and state health departments.  Most explanations pertain to staff 
turnover or inexperience as well as provider fear of harassment.  However, without additional information, it 
                                                           
11 As noted, the project was a joint effort between researchers at the National Bureau of Economic Research and the Alan 
Guttmacher Institute. 
12 Table 1 in the Appendix displays the results of our data collection.  The first three columns list the 31 states from which 
we have collected individual-level data on induced abortion.  The 20 states listed in the right-hand column will not release 
or do not collect information on induced abortion at the individual level with sufficient detail for our purposes. Data for 
18 of the 31 states for which we have data are complete with respect to age, race, marital status, schooling and parity 
(column 1).  The seven states listed in column 2 lack some combination of these characteristics, whereas the states listed 
in column 3 have more severe limitations.  
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is not possible to determine whether the discrepancy in the number of abortions between AGI and the state 
health departments is related to characteristics of the women, and how this might vary over time.  
Certain characteristics of women are reported more completely in the data than are others.  In Table 2 
we show the number of abortions in each state between 1992 and 2000, and the percent of observations 
missing by characteristics of the mother.  The most problematic characteristic is education.  In six of the 18 
states that consistently report education, the proportion unknown exceeds 10 percent.  The second-to-last 
column displays the percent of total observations dropped due to missing data for one or all of the 
characteristics.  In the sample of 18 states and New York City, we lose 16 percent of observations in analyses 
that use education, age, race and marital status.  In the 24-state sample that is limited to teens, we lose only 
seven percent of the observations since we do not use education and marital status.  What is not shown in 
Table 2 is that the proportion of observations missing varies over time due primarily to missing data on 
education, which is potentially problematic in the pre-post analysis of adult women.  We can do little about 
the missing data; however, births among adults are well reported and thus a significant decline in births 
unaccompanied by a change in abortions would raise concerns as to the quality of the abortion data.  In 
addition, we do not use education in the analysis of teens. 
 
Births 
Information on births is from national natality files.  The main measurement issue of concern relates to 
marital status in New York and Nevada.
13  Due to a change in the methods used to determine marital status, 
out-of-wedlock births in New York City declined almost 10 percentage points between 1996 and 1997 (New 
York City Department of Health 1998).  Similar though smaller changes occurred in Nevada.  The problem is 
limited to births since marital status on New York City and Nevada induced termination certificates has always 
                                                           
13 In New York, marital status of the mother is inferred from a paternity acknowledgment or missing father’s name on the 
birth certificate.  Prior to 1996, Nevada and New York City depended on a comparison of the mother’s and father’s 
surnames.  In 1997, Nevada changed from inference to a direct question and New York City changed to an inferential 
system comparable to upstate New York.  In New York City the proportion of births to unmarried women tended to 
increase among women aged 15-24 years but decrease among women 30-34 (National Center for Health Statistics, 1999).  
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been based on a direct question.  The change in New York will not affect our estimates since we use New 
York only in the teen sample and in these analyses we use all births regardless of marital status.  
 
Population 
We use population estimates to obtain birth and abortion rates.  We use three sources of population 
data.  We use population estimates by state, year, age and race from the US Census Bureau website for annual 
birth and abortion rates.  These are the most accurate, but are not available by the level of disaggregation (by 
marital status, schooling, and parity) we require.  We therefore use population estimates from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) to create annual birth and abortion rates by state, year, age, race, marital status, and 
schooling for the 18 states  in our adult sample.  Estimates for a particular year are the weighted average of the 
outgoing rotation files from the 12 monthly surveys.   Finally, we use the June CPS fertility modules in 1992, 
1994, 1998 and 2000 to create population estimates further stratified by parity.   We estimate rates only for 
aggregates of states in the time-series plots and simple DDs.   Population estimates are not reliable enough at 
the level of the individual state for the desired subgroups (i.e., age, race, marital status, schooling and parity) to 
permit regressions of birth and abortion rates.  
We focus on three outcomes: birth rates, abortion rates and the abortion ratio defined as the fraction of 
pregnancies (births plus induced abortions) that end in abortion.  We also discuss pregnancy rates, which are 
the sum of birth and abortion rates.  Each outcome is dated to the year of conception. We subtract gestational 
age from the date of the birth or abortion to approximate the date of conception. Thus, the final year of the 
analysis is labeled 1999, although many of the births and some of the abortions occurred in 2000.  
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Samples 
We analyze two samples: adult women 20 to 34 years of age who are unmarried and who have 
completed no more than 12 years of schooling, and teens, 15 to 19 years of age.
14  We exclude women aged 35 
and older because only about 10 percent of all abortions occur at these ages (Koonin et al. 1999), and sample 
sizes become small when stratified by race, schooling, marital status and parity.
  We analyze teens separately 
because for teens we use only parity to define teens at risk for public assistance.  Furthermore, since we don’t 
require information on education or marital status for teens we are able to expand the number of states in our 
sample from 18 to 24.  We analyze whites and blacks only, because, except for New York City, none of the 
states in our adult sample has a sizeable Latino population.   
 
Dependent and Policy Variables 
Information on family cap policies are from Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation of the 
Department of Health and Human Services and the State Documentation Project of the Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities (www.cbpp.org and www.spdp.org/tanf.htm).  Our definition of states with the family cap 
agrees with those of Kearney (forthcoming) and Dyer and Fairlie (2001), except for two minor differences 




 Time-series: birth and abortion rates 
 
Figure 2 shows abortion and birth rates (per thousand women) by year of conception for unmarried 
women 20 to 34 years of age and with 12 or fewer years of schooling.  The population denominator for these 
                                                           
14 As Kearney (forthcoming) and Joyce, Kaestner and Korenman (2003) have shown, approximately 50 percent of 
unmarried mothers with less than 12 years of schooling received public assistance in the previous  year.  To further 
characterize these women, in Appendix Table 2 we present data on the percent of births and abortions to women on 
Medicaid in 1994, a proxy for women at risk for public assistance.  Data on Medicaid-financed births comes from the 
Pregnancy Risk Assessment Monitoring System (PRAMS) from 10 states.  For abortions, we use AGI’s nationally 
representative survey of women that abort (Henshaw and Kost 1996).  Two points are noteworthy.  First, schooling and 
  
  17
rates is from the annual CPS outgoing rotation files, since we do not stratify by parity.  Both birth and abortion 
rates turn slightly upwards after 1996 but the rise in birth rates is somewhat more pronounced.  Births started 
to rise in 1994 and exhibit a slight acceleration in 1996.  The minor increase in the abortion rates, however, is 
counter to a generally downward trend among women in this socioeconomic stratum, and is clearly counter to 
national trends in abortion (Figure 1).  The rise in the birth rate, however, is inconsistent with a behavioral 
response to welfare reform, which would suggest a decrease.
15  
Figure 3 presents birth and abortion rates for teens for states with and without family cap policies.
16 
Birth and abortion rates trend downward over the 1990s, but the level and trend in each are similar in states 
with and without family caps.
17    
 
Difference-in-differences in Rates 
 
Tables 3 and 4 present abortion and birth rates for teens and unmarried adult women 20 to 34 years of 
age with 12 or fewer years of schooling, by parity, for periods before and after welfare reform.  We use the 
June CPS fertility module in 1992 and 1994, to estimate population in states with and without family caps in 
1992-1993 and the June CPS fertility module in 1998 and 2000 to estimate population in 1998-1999.  There 
are 24 states for the teen sample and 18 states for the adult sample.  
Birth rates are defined as births per 1000 women of the specific demographic group and are shown in 
Table 3.  For teens, we show birth rates for all teens and teens with one or more previous live births.  Teen 
birth rates fall in absolute and relative terms over the period but the decline among teens of parity one or more 
is particularly sharp and greater in states with a family cap (57 percent versus 40 percent). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
marital status effectively characterize women at risk for public assistance; and second, women with a previous live birth 
are at greater risk than women with no previous live births.  
15 Birth and abortion rates by race are shown in Figure A1 of the Appendix.  The only notable difference is that the 
abortion rate increases more among blacks after 1996 than among whites.  
16 We are able to present rates stratified by cap and non-cap states because we are not disaggregating by schooling and 
marital status.  Population by age and race are available from the census. 
17 We present rates for teens by race in Figures A2 and A3 of the Appendix.  The pattern for whites and blacks is largely 
similar.  The one difference is that the black teen abortion rate is substantially greater in states without a family cap, 
although trends in the two groups of states are similar.  
  18
For less educated and unmarried adults, the lower half of Table 3 shows birth rates for all parities, 
women of zero parity and women with one or more previous live births.  We view women of zero parity as an 
appropriate comparison group for women of parity 1 or more. Among adults, birth rates decline more among 
higher parity women than women of zero parity in absolute terms, but the relative decline (DDs), –0.10 and –
0.12, is similar in states with and without family caps. 
 We display similar changes for abortion rates in Table 4.  As with births, we observe a general decline 
in abortion rates of all teens but the decline among teens of parity one or more is greater in absolute terms but 
roughly similar in relative terms.  Again, the fall in abortion rates among teens with at least one previous live 
birth is relatively greater in states with a family cap (57 versus 40 percent).  The lower panel of Table 4 shows 
the same estimates for adult women.  In this case, abortion rates fall less for higher-parity women than for 
zero-parity women in states with a family cap and abortion rates rise among higher parity women in states 
without a family cap.  The DD in relative terms is positive in states with family caps (0.286), but is also 
positive in states without family caps (0.253).  
We also compute changes in pregnancy rates, which are displayed  in Table A3 of the Appendix.  
Changes in pregnancy rates are weighted sums of changes in birth and abortion rates. The DD estimates for the 
adult pregnancy rates are essentially zero.   Among teens of parity one or more, pregnancy rates decline over 
the study period, and the decline is greater for teens in states with a family cap than in states without.  
Pregnancy rates among adults in states with a family cap fall over the study period but the relative decline is 
the same by parity.   In states without family caps pregnancy rates rise slightly but there is no difference by 
parity.   
The importance of analyzing both abortion and birth rates in states with and without a family cap is 
underscored by results in Tables 3, 4 and A3.  For adults, the within-state DDs for birth and abortion rates 
within family-cap states are largely consistent with an effect of the family cap: a decrease in birth rates, a 
relative increase in abortion rates, with no change in relative pregnancy rates.  But the same pattern is observed 
in states without a family cap.  Taken together, changes in birth and abortion rates among adult women 
exposed to the family cap is more consistent with general  trends in reproductive choices among lesser-skilled  
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women, than a specific response to the family cap.  The results for teens were similar in that there was a 




We display abortion ratios by years of conception, cap and non-cap states, and parity, for teens and 
unmarried adult women with 12 or fewer years of schooling in Table 5.  The change in the abortion ratio can 
be obtained from knowledge of the relative change in abortion and birth rates, which provides a consistency 
check for the analysis.  When the relative decline in the birth rate exceeds the relative decline in the abortion 
rate, the abortion ratio rises.  Thus, the abortion ratio among teens of parity one or more in states with a family 
cap is unchanged between 1992-93 and 1998-99 (Table 5, top panel), since the relative decline in birth and 
abortion rates is the same over this period (Tables 3 and 4, top panel).  However, the within-state DD for adult 
abortion ratios in Table 5 is positive and large because the relative decline in birth rates greatly exceeds the fall 
in abortion rates among women of zero parity.  Thus, the simple DD for the adult abortion ratio is consistent 
with a negative effect of the family cap on fertility.  This interpretation, however, is again undermined by 
similar changes in states without family caps.  The simple DD for adults in non-cap states is also positive and 
of equal magnitude to the DD in states with a family cap.  Thus, welfare reform or other contemporaneous 
influences, but not the family cap in particular, may have increased abortion more at higher parities.
18 
 The simple DDs in Tables 3 –5 describe changes in reproductive choices before and after the recent waves 
of welfare reform and implementation of family cap provisions.  To more accurately associate changes in 
births and abortions with the timing of various policies we turn to the estimation of equation (1).  An important 
advantage of the abortion ratio is that we have counts of births and abortions in our sample states and are able 
to construct a panel by state, year, age, schooling, marital status, parity and race.  Consequently, we obtain 
estimates of the association between changes in the abortion ratio and the implementation of welfare reform 
                                                           
 
18 This might be expected if welfare reform, for example, reduced desired family size among high-risk women, but did 
not affect the timing of first births.  We explore the more general effects of welfare reform in a companion paper that does 
not look explicitly at the family cap (Joyce et al. 2003).  
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and the family cap adjusted for other covariates as well as state and year fixed effects.   We also present 
estimates based on regressions of log abortions and log births adjusted for aggregate population totals as 
proxies for regressions of abortion and birth rates, respectively. 
 
Regression Adjusted Estimates 
  Estimates of equation (1) by age and race are displayed in Table 6.  There are three outcomes: the 
natural logarithm of abortions, the natural logarithm of births and the abortion ratio.  For adults we present 
three estimates: the DD in states with family caps (DDcap), the DDD; and the cross-state DD (DDcross-state).  The 
latter is obtained by comparing changes among women of parity one or more in states with a family cap to 
changes among similar women in states without a family cap.  For teens we show only the cross-state DD.  For 
adults we find statistically significant evidence consistent with an effect of the family cap if we examine only 
states with a family cap.  Log abortions rise 29 percent in regressions for whites and blacks combined; log 
births are unchanged or rise modestly, which results in a statistically significant increase in the abortion ratio 
of approximately 16 percent for blacks and whites combined evaluated at the mean (top panel).
19  The DDDs, 
however, generally reduce the magnitude of the effect, and none of the estimates are statistically significant, 
although the standard errors for abortion are rather large.  In addition, the cross-state DD for abortion is 
essentially zero, which combined with the rise in births, causes the abortion ratio to decline.  Separate 
estimates for whites and blacks follow a similar pattern. Results for teens are in the lower third of Table 6.  We 
show only the cross-state DD for teens since we do not consider teens of zero parity an appropriate comparison 
group for higher parity teens.
20   Inferences for teens are similar to those of adults.  The increase in abortions is 
offset by the rise in births leaving the abortion ratio unchanged.  From this we infer that trends in birth and 
abortion rates among women at risk for public assistance differ importantly by parity, but neither the trends 
nor the differences in the trends appear related to the family cap.  
                                                           
19 The change in the abortion ratio relative to the mean is approximately .040/.250 or  16 percent.  
20 Our conclusions do not change if we use teens of zero parity as a comparison group.    
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  Regression-adjusted estimates for the abortion ratio are very similar to those from the simple DDs and 
DDDs in Table 5.  There is less agreement between the regression results in Table 6 and the simple DD 
estimates for birth and abortion rates in Tables 3 and 4, especially among teens.  DD estimates for adults in 
Table 3 indicate that birth rates fell between 1992/93 and 1998/99 in family cap states whereas in Table 6 
similar changes in log births adjusted for the aggregate population suggest that this proxy for  birth rates 
increased after implementation of the family cap.   Otherwise, results pertaining to adults in Tables 3, 4 and 6 
are consistent.  For teens, the DD estimates in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that birth and abortion rates fell between 
1992/3 and 1998/99.  But in Table 6, changes in adjusted log births and log abortions imply an increase in 
births and abortion rates before and after implementation of family cap policies.  This disagreement may be 
related to the different specification of year and policy effects, or to the measurement error associated with 
population.  We suspect that our inability to adequately adjust for population in the log birth regressions is the 
most plausible explanation.   First, the DDs and DDDs for the abortion ratio in Table 5 and the regression-
adjusted estimates in Table 6 are almost identical, which suggests that the more refined timing of the policy 
measures in the regressions does not alter the estimates.  Second, we computed simple DDs and  DDDs as in 
Tables 3 and 4 with the natural log of births and abortions as the outcome (results not shown).   They were also 
very similar to the adjusted estimates in Table 6.  In other words, the inclusion of the log of the state 
population by age and race on the right-hand-side of equation (1) had little effect on our estimates.   Third, 
other researchers have obtained similar results.  Kearney (forthcoming), Joyce, Kaestner and Korenman 
(forthcoming) and Levine (2002) have also found that the family cap is positively related to log births in 
selected samples of  low-educated, unmarried women.  The counter-intuitive result is generally statistically 
insignificant, but the sign and magnitude of the coefficient is similar to the estimates that we report in Table 6.  
The lack of detailed population data for the relevant subgroups by state and year is a key motivation 
for including the abortion ratio as an outcome.  Although we cannot make inferences about changes in 
pregnancies associated with the family cap with the abortion ratio, it is relatively well-measured among 
women and teens who are likely exposed to welfare reform.  Moreover, the change in the abortion ratio, 
conditional on pregnancy is relevant for many poor women, and especially teens, given the prevalence of  
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unintended pregnancy.  In addition, changes in the abortion ratios reflect relative changes in birth and abortion 
rates.  Since the DDDs for the abortion ratios are small and statistically insignificant, and since the simple 
DDDs of birth and abortion rates are also inconsistent with an effect of the family cap, we conclude that the 




  Some of the architects of welfare reform were concerned that reductions in non-marital childbearing 
might be accompanied by an increase in abortion.  An experimental analysis of New Jersey’s family cap 
implemented in 1992 indicated that these fears were well-founded, as births fell and abortions rose in response 
to the policy change (Jagannathan and Camasso 2003).  On the other hand, several non-experimental studies 
have found no effect of the family cap.  In this study we use individual birth and abortion records from 24 
states to obtain estimates of the association between implementation of a family cap and changes in birth and 
abortion rates among women and teens at risk for public assistance.  We found that, although birth rates have 
fallen among teen and adult mothers most affected by the family cap, they also fell among comparable mothers 
who lived in states without family caps.  We observed a similar pattern with abortions: a relative increase 
among women of higher parity in states with and without a family cap.  We speculate that a decline in 
pregnancy rates at higher parities may be related to welfare reform more generally or other contemporaneous 
influences, but that these trends are not a specific response to the family cap.  
  A contribution of our study is the addition of abortions as an outcome.  Except for the evaluation of 
New Jersey’s family cap, all previous non-experimental studies have been limited to an analysis of births.  
Abortion data contribute to our analysis in two ways.  First, abortion data can provide confirmatory evidence 
of a possible association of fertility behaviors with the family cap.  Birth rates of teens at higher parities, for 
instance, fell relatively more in states with compared to states without a family cap.  However, the relative 
decline of abortion rates among teens of higher parity was also greater in states with a family cap, which is 
inconsistent with an effect of the family cap.  A second advantage of data on abortion is that they allow 
multivariate analysis of the abortion ratio for women of lower economic status.   We would have preferred to  
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analyze both birth and abortion rates with multivariate methods, but population data are not available in 
sufficient detail.  Importantly, multivariate estimates of the association between the family cap and the 
abortion ratio were very similar to the simple DDs and consistent with the simple DDs of the birth and 
abortion rates.  
  A limitation of the abortion ratio as an outcome is that it provides no information on changes in 
contraception and sexual activity associated with the family cap.  However, unintended pregnancy is quite 
prevalent among women on public assistance, which suggests that pregnancy resolution (abortion ratios) may 
be sensitive to changes in fertility intentions (timing or completed fertility).  For instance, the abortion rate 
among women with income less than 100 percent of the federal poverty level is two to three times the 
abortion rate of women with incomes above 300 percent of poverty (Jones, Darroch and Henshaw 2002).  
Welfare recipients often report that their births are the result of unintended pregnancies.  In an evaluation of 
Delaware’s waiver program, A Better Chance (ABC), 82 percent of the welfare participants that had a baby 
during the trial reported that the pregnancy was unintended (Fein 1999).   In short, the high prevalence of 
unintended pregnancy among women of lower socioeconomic status leads us to expect that a substantial 
decline in births associated with the family cap should be accompanied by an increase in the abortion ratio. 
  A limitation of vital statistics is the inability to precisely identify women on or at risk for public 
assistance.  As a result, we may have had insufficient power to detect small but statistically significant changes 
in reproductive choices associated with the family cap.  The advantage of our approach as opposed to an 
analysis of women on welfare is that we are able to capture changes among those at risk for public assistance 
provided the response is sufficiently large to be detected.   Our results suggest that there have been no major 
reproductive responses to the family cap.     
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Table 1.  
Total Abortions by State of Occurrence as Reported by the Alan Guttmacher Institute and State Health 
Departments, 1996 
 
State:  AGI  State Health Department  Percent Difference 
    
Alabama 15150  13826  -8.7 
Arizona 19310  11016  -43.0 
Arkansas 6200  5882  -5.1 
Hawaii 6930  4916  -29.1 
Idaho 1600  1022  -36.1 
Kansas 10630  10683  0.5 
Maine 2700  2602  -3.6 
Minnesota 14660  14193  -3.2 
Mississippi 4490  4206  -6.3 
Missouri 10810  11629  7.6 
Montana 2900  2763  -4.7 
Nevada 15450  6965  -54.9 
New York*  167600  145519  -13.2 
North Carolina  33550  33554  0.0 
North Dakota  1290  1292  0.2 
Ohio 42870  36426  -15.0 
Oregon 15050  13767  -8.5 
Rhode Island  5420  5432  0.2 
South Carolina  9940  9326  -6.2 
Tennessee 17990  16153  -10.2 
Texas 91270  91470  0.2 
Utah 3700  3637  -1.7 
Virginia 29940  25770  -13.9 
West Virginia  2610  2470  -5.4 
      






Total Abortions and Percent with Missing data by Characteristics of Women in 26 States, 1992-2000 
  % Unknown in Following Fields:
 
 
State of Occurrence  Number of Total
Abortions 
Education Age Race  Marital
 
Status 
Parity  % of Total
Lost 
Number of Abortions 
Remaining
Alabama  123,999   12.04 1.32 1.05 1.51 0.93  15.44  104,848 
Arizona  111,722   29.65 6.01 0.00  28.87 0.00  6.01
a 105,012 
Arkansas  51,458    5.53 2.06 1.15 2.76 4.85  14.47  44,012 
Hawaii  45,047   25.58 0.90 8.83  100.00 1.45   10.82
a 40,172 
Idaho  9,197    4.13 0.83 0.33 0.18 0.12  5.23  8,716 
Kansas  100,643    0.88 1.16 0.69 0.30 0.31  3.04  97,579 
Maine  24,951    8.48 1.63 2.73  12.85  10.12  29.73  17,532 
Minnesota  129,591   80.93 1.35 1.94 2.96 0.10  5.72
b 122,176 
Mississippi  41,221   14.67 1.54 0.16 0.36 0.06  16.25  34,522 
Missouri  95,929    2.67 1.06 0.40 1.34 0.06  5.25  90,893 
Montana  24,034   10.14 0.77 7.23 7.49 0.05  15.22  20,377 
Nevada  60,825    4.68 2.63  12.14 3.15 0.65  17.80  49,999 
Upstate New York  376,553   24.53  1.24  15.48  100.00  2.26  29.24
 c 266,455 
New York City  933,324   8.49  1.08  4.34  2.81  0.87  15.35  790,089 
North Carolina  295,645   20.34  3.19  2.17  10.82  1.86  25.81  219,350 
North  Dakota  11,971    1.54 0.58 0.17 0.40 0.04  2.53  11,668 
Ohio  328,735    5.37 1.64 6.52 3.24  11.45  23.41  251,765 
Oregon  124,179    2.65 1.26 1.48 3.66 0.80  7.45  114,932 
Rhode  Island  50,982   15.99 0.58 1.88 7.18 0.02  18.58  41,508 
South  Carolina  86,078    0.21 0.98 0.02 0.04 0.02  1.25  85,006 
Tennessee  146,702   22.65 0.22 0.49 0.69 0.28  1.56
b 144,420 
Texas  773,334    100.00 1.46 4.12 5.11 0.26  9.01
b 703,644 
Utah  32,624    1.23 1.01 4.98 0.36 0.13  7.14  30,294 
Virginia  242,924   13.10 1.16 1.49  12.58 1.68  22.05  189,371 
West Virginia 
$  23,221    4.48 0.91 0.08 0.24 0.07  5.54  21,935 
*Total (18 states + NYC):  2,661,940    8.91 1.46 3.36 4.50 2.38  16.44  2,224,396   
Total (24 states):  4,244,889   10.85  1.51  4.40  4.42  1.77  7.31**     3,934,536  
* Excluded states: AZ, HI, MN, NY, TN, TX. **% lost based on age, race and parity. 
a not including education and marital status; 
b not including education; 
c not including marital status. 






Birth Rates for Teens and Unmarried Women Ages 20-34 with 12 or Fewer Years of Schooling by Year of 
Conception, Race and States with and without Family Caps, 1992-1999* 














TEENS:          
  States with a Family Cap Provision: 
          
All parities  67  61  -6  -0.103     
          
Parity: 1+  202  114  -88  -0.572     
          
  States without a Family Cap Provision: 
          
All parities  64  45  -14  -0.271     
          
Parity: 1+  162  109  -53  -0.396  -35  -0.176 
          
ADULTS:          
  States with a Family Cap Provision: 
          
All parities  112  107  -5  -0.050     
          
Parity: 0  91  92  1  0.012     
          
Parity: 1+  126  116  -11  -0.090  -12  -0.101 
          
  States without a Family Cap Provision: 
          
All parities  101  104  3  0.027     
          
Parity: 0  77  85  8  0.096     
          
Parity: 1+  119  116  -2  -0.021  -10  -0.117 
          
*The teen birth rate is defined as births per 1000 teens of designated parity.  The adult birth rate is births per 1000 
unmarried women with 12 or fewer years of schooling of the indicated parity.  Population estimates are from the 
June CPS Fertility Module in 1992, 1994, 1998 and 2000.   We use population estimates in 1992 and 1994 for the 
years 1992-93 and the June CPS in 1998 and 2000 for the years 1998-99. The adult sample includes 18 states: AL, 
AR, ID, KS, ME, MS, MO, MT, NV, NC, ND, OH, OR, RI, SC, UT, VA, and WV.   The teen sample includes 6 
additional states: AZ, HI, MN, NY, TN and TX.  Family caps were enforced in Arizona (11/95), Arkansas (7/94), 
Idaho (7/97), Mississippi (10/95), North Carolina (7/96), North Dakota (7/97), South Carolina (10/96), Tennessee 
(9/96), and Virginia (7/95).  Relative changes are approximated by the difference in logs. The difference-in-
differences (DDs) for teens is the change in birth rates among teens of parity one or more in states without family 
caps subtracted from the change among teens in states with family caps.  The DDs for adults within family cap 






Abortion Rates for Teens and Unmarried Women Ages 20-34 with 12 or Fewer Years of Schooling by 
Year of Conception, Race and States with and without Family Caps,  
1992-1999* 
 













TEENS:            
  States with a Family Cap Provision: 
      
All parities 22  15  -7 -0.354  
      
Parity: 1+  47  27  -21 -0.569  
      
  States without a Family Cap Provision: 
      
All parities 27  19  -7 -0.369  
      
Parity: 1+  65  44  -22 -0.404 1  -0.165
      
ADULTS:            
  States with a Family Cap Provision: 
      
All parities 43  32  -11 -0.298  
      
Parity: 0  38  23  -15 -0.505  
      
Parity: 1+  47  37  -9 -0.220 6  0.286
      
  States without a Family Cap Provision: 
      
All parities 38  40  2 0.040  
      
Parity: 0  28  24  -4 -0.158  
      
Parity: 1+  46  50  5 0.095 9  0.253
      
The abortion rate is defined as abortions per 1000 women or teens of the relevant demographic groups.  See  






Abortion Ratio for White and Black Teens and Unmarried Women Ages 20-34 with 12 or Fewer Years of 
Schooling by Year of Conception, and States with and without Family Caps, 1992-1999* 
 
 














TEENS:        
  States with a Family Cap Provision: 
        
All parities  0.243  0.2  -0.043  -0.195     
        
Parity: 1+  0.19  0.19  0.001  0.003     
        
  States without a Family Cap Provision: 
        
All parities  0.295  0.275  -0.019  -0.068     
        
Parity:  1+  0.287 0.285 -0.002 -0.005 0.003 0.008 
        
ADULTS:        
  States with a Family Cap Provision: 
        
All parities  0.279 0.231 -0.047  -0.186     
        
Parity: 0  0.296 0.201 -0.096  -0.390     
        
Parity: 1+  0.270 0.245 -0.025 -0.097 0.071 0.293 
        
  States without a Family Cap Provision: 
        
All parities  0.275 0.278 0.003 0.009     
        
Parity: 0  0.267 0.221 -0.047  -0.193     
        
Parity: 1+  0.279 0.302 0.024 0.082 0.071 0.274 
 





Adjusted Difference-in-differences (DD) Associated with the Family Cap for the Log of Abortions, the Log of Births, and the Ratio 
of Abortions to Pregnancies (Abortions plus Births) to Teens and Unmarried Adult Women with 12 or Fewer Years of Schooling by 
Years of Conception, 1992-1999 
 
  Whites and Blacks:    Whites:    Blacks: 


















  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6)    (7) (8) (9) 
ADULTS:          




**   (0.030)
** (0.023)
** (0.010)




                 
DDD  0.145 0.055 0.012    0.080 0.030 0.008    0.083 0.077 -0.010 
 (0.078)
* (0.032) (0.015)   (0.063) (0.030) (0.015)   (0.077) (0.055) (0.013) 
                 
DDcross-state 0.002 0.073 -0.025    -0.081 0.150 -0.051    -0.005 0.097 -0.030 
 (0.122)  (0.027)
** (0.028)    (0.136) (0.064)
* (0.025)
*   (0.133)  (0.030)
** (0.030) 
                 
R-squared 0.958 0.989 0.753    0.952 0.991 0.733    0.962 0.992 0.858 
N  288 288 288    288 288 288    216 216 216 
TEENS:          
DDcross-state 0.113 0.062 0.012    0.069 0.069 0.001    0.115 0.077 0.007 
 (0.077)  (0.029)
**  (0.014)   (0.069) (0.037) (0.010)   (0.086) (0.033) (0.019) 
                 
R-squared 0.986 0.994 0.941    0.986 0.995 0.938    0.981 0.985 0.949 
N  384 384 384    384 384 384    304 304 304 
Note:  DD cap  refers to difference-in-differences within family cap states.  The DDD subtracts the DD in non-cap states from the DD in cap 
states.  The DD cross-states  refers to difference-in-differences among births of parity 1 or higher between cap and non-cap states. All 
regressions include state and year fixed effects.  Standard errors have been corrected for clustering within states. 
+ significant at 10%; 
* 
significant at 5%; 
** significant at 1%  
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Figure 2. Abortion and birth rates for white and black unmarried, low-ed women aged 20-34, 

























* AL, AR, ID, KS, ME, MS, MO, MT, NV,  NC, ND, OH, OR, RI, SC, UT, VA, WV.  
Population estimates are from  the CPS Outgoing Rotation Files.  
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Figure 3. Abortion and birth rates for white and black teens aged 15-19 in 24 states*, by 

























Birth rate, no famcap
Abortion rate, no famcap
* AL, AZ, AR, HI, ID, KS, ME, MN, MS, MO, MT, NV,NY, NC, ND, OH, OR, RI, SC, TN, TX, UT, VA, WV.  Population 
estimates are from the U.S. Census Bureau.
Abortion rate, famcap
Birth rate, famcap 
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Appendix Table 1. 
Availability of Micro-level Induced Termination of Pregnancy Files, 1992-2000  
 
 
States that Contributed Data --  Maternal Characteristics and Years Available: 
 
Non-Contributing States – Reasons: 
Abortions by age, race, 
marital status, parity 
schooling, 1992-2000 
Abortions by age and race but 
missing marital status (mr) or 
schooling (ed), parity or years  
Abortions by age but missing race 
(r) or marital status (ms) or 
schooling (ed) or years (1992-00) 
Abortions unavailable due to statutory 
restrictions (sr) or inadequate data 
collection and or storage (idc) 
Alabama  Arizona (only 2 categories of ed)  Delaware (92-96)  Alaska (idc) 
Arkansas  Colorado (parity)  Georgia (92-93, 00)  California (idc) 
Idaho  Indiana (parity)  Michigan (ed, r, 92-95)  Connecticut (idc) 
Kansas  Hawaii (ms)  Oklahoma (92-99)  Florida (idc) 
Maine  New Jersey (ed, select counties)    Illinois (sr) 
Mississippi  New York (excluding NYC) (ms)    Iowa (sr) 
Missouri  Tennessee (1999-2000, ed)    Kentucky (idc) 
Montana  Texas (ed)    Louisiana (sr) 
Nevada  Minnesota (ed, 92-98)    Maryland (idc) 
New York City      Massachusetts (idc) 
North Carolina      Nebraska (idc) 
North Dakota      New Hampshire (idc) 
Ohio     New  Mexico  (idc) 
Oregon     Pennsylvania  (sr) 
Rhode Island      South Dakota (sr) 
South Carolina      Vermont (sr) 
Utah     Washington  (idc) 
Virginia     Washington  D.C.  (idc) 
West Virginia (1992)      Wisconsin (sr) 





Appendix Table 2. 
 
Proportion of Women 20 to 34 years of Age Whose Birth or Abortion Was Financed by 




Percent of abortions 
to Women on 
Medicaid * 
 
Percent of Births 
to Women on 
Medicaid ** 
No previous live births:    
Less than 12 years of schooling – Not Married   25.2% (103)  85.2 
12 years of schooling—Not Married  21.8% (441)  71.8 
12 or more years of schooling—Not Married  10.2% (1631)  58.9 
12 or more years of schooling--Married    8.9% (180)  17.9 
    
One or more previous live births:    
Less than 12 years of schooling – Not Married   42.0% (500)  93.1 
12 years of schooling—Not Married  36.5% (1296)  80.6 
12 or more years of schooling—Not Married  24.2% (1583)  67.8 
12 or more years of schooling--Married    14.3% (792)  20.8 
* Authors’ tabulations of 1994 survey of abortion patients (Henshaw and 1996).  Only states that finance abortions for 
women on Medicaid are included.  





Pregnancy Rates for Teens and Unmarried Women Ages 20-34 with 12 or Fewer Years of 
Schooling by Year of Conception, Race and States with and without Family Caps, 1992-1999* 
 
     First Difference  Difference-in-differences 
  1992-1993  1998-1999  Absolute Relative Absolute Relative 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TEENS:       
  States with a Family Cap Provision       
All parities  89  76  -13  -0.159     
        
Parity: 0  75  67  -8  -0.112     
        
Parity: 1+  249  141  -109  -0.572     
        
  States without a Family Cap Provision       
All parities  91  67  -24  -0.302     
        
Parity: 0  77  58  -19  -0.285     
        
Parity: 1+  228  153  -75  -0.398  -34  -0.173 
        
ADULTS:        
  States with a Family Cap Provision       
All parities  156  139  -17  -0.113     
        
Parity: 0  129  115  -14  -0.116     
        
Parity: 1+  173  153  -20  -0.123  -6  -0.007 
        
  States without a Family Cap Provision       
All parities  139  143  4  0.031     
        
Parity: 0  105  109  4  0.034     
        
Parity: 1+  164  167  2  0.013  -2  -0.021 
        
 
*The teen pregnancy rate is defined as pregnancies per 1000 teens of designated parity.  The adult 
pregnancy rate is pregnancies per 1000 unmarried women with 12 or fewer years of schooling of the 
indicated parity.  Population estimates are from the June CPS Fertility Module in 1992, 1994, 1998 and 
2000.   We use population estimates in 1992 and 1994 for the years 1992-93 and the June CPS in 1998 
and 2000 for the years 1998-99. The adult sample includes 18 states: AL, AR, ID, KS, ME, MS, MO, 
MT, NV,  NC, ND, OH, OR, RI, SC, UT, VA, and WV.   The teen sample includes 6 additional states: 
AZ, HI, MN, NY, TN and TX.  Family caps were enforced in Arizona (11/95), Arkansas (7/94), Idaho 
(7/97), Mississippi (10/95), North Carolina (7/96), North Dakota (7/97), South Carolina (10/96), 
Tennessee (9/96), and Virginia (7/95).  Relative changes are approximated by the difference in logs. The 
difference-in-differences (DDs) for teens is the change in pregnancy rates among teens of parity one or 
more in states with and without family caps.  
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Figure A1. Abortion and birth rates for unmarried, low-ed women aged 20-34 by race, 18 





























* AL, AR, ID, KS, ME, MS, MO, MT, NV,  NC, ND, OH, OR, RI, SC, UT, VA, WV.  Population estimates are from the CPS Outgoing Rotation Files. 
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Figure A2. Abortion and birth rates for white teens aged 15-19 in 24 states*, by family cap 
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Figure A3. Abortion and birth rates for black teens aged 15-19 in 24 states*, by family cap 








1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
* AL, AZ, AR, HI, ID, KS, ME, MN, MS, MO, MT, NV,NY, NC, ND, OH, OR, RI, SC, TN, TX, UT, VA, WV
Birth rate, famcap
Birth rate, no famcap
Abortion rate, no famcap
Abortion rate, famcap